In my paper I will explore Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s notion of becoming-imperceptible and demonstrate how this notion works in Beckett’s texts. Deleuze often refers to Beckett’s characters, rethinking them in terms of desiring-production, schizophrenia, the body without organs, becoming, and becoming-imperceptible. The Beckettian characters, wandering in the schizophrenic promenades and obsessed with the combinatorial exercises of exhaustion, function not as a simple example but as an argument strengthening the contours of a new immanent ontology. This new immanent ontology raises the question of life in terms of non-personal and even non-organic power, which, by passing through different intensities and becomings, moves towards becoming-imperceptible. But what is becoming-imperceptible? How can we rid ourselves of ourselves and how can we evade perception and self-perception? To answer these questions we have to define the new immanent ontology and to discuss, in Rosi Braidotti’s terms, “the ethics of becoming-imperceptible” (Braidotti 2006). The new understanding of life as a non-personal and non-organic power requires the theory of immanent ethics that could redirect our thinking from the question of the individual or person toward the philosophy of the impersonal.
Braidotti, Rosi. 2006. “The Ethics of Becoming-Imperceptible.” In Deleuze and Philosophy, edited by Constantin V. Boundas, 133–59. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press.