Diagrammatic Traits: Scream(S)-Force(S)-Manifold(S)

Departing from Kant-Deleuze’s notion of synthesis understood as a “rule of construction” by which a complexion of heterogeneous elements is driven to the consistency of a concept, this panel inquires its diagrammatic conditions—that is, its operative potential for the creation of transversal relations. Andres Vahos engages in the operative dimension of the cry—an operation problematising the lien between image and force—by constructing a relation between the sensible “signal” and the invisible or inaudible forces stirring the cry. Claudia Mongini examines the Leibnizian concept of force in terms of its logics: the potential for a synthetic construction of an “architecture of multiplicities.” Force is grasped in its intrinsic relational conditions, as a mechanism of transversal production. Emiddio Vasquez’s intervention departs from a pragmatic problem encountered in his making of art, the presence of “false dualism” between analogue and digital. He proposes to think of this impasse in terms of Riemaniann (and Deleuzian) manifolds. This panel asks whether the operation of synthesis—a factor producing (and problematising) difference in each intervention—can be transposed as a critical point of inquiry between the papers as well, thus opening the point of view of a (problematic) relation between aesthetics, ontology, and artistic practice. Can this strategy be conductive towards the creation of an agencement of artistic research?

 

«Du cri au sourire»: éléments d’esthétique Deleuzienne

Andres Vahos

Selon Deleuze, le crissement, le bégaiement et la glossolalie sont des traits de « l’image moderne de la pensée ». Si les deux derniers sont abordés à l’aide de notions issues de la linguistique, le crissement semble moins thématisé. Notre présentation audiovisuelle montre l’importance du « cri » dans la philosophie de Deleuze et problématise cette notion à partir de la dimension critique et clinique des forces qui nous poussent à « crier ». Pour Deleuze, les principes philosophiques constituent des véritables cris, les concepts étant le chant qui module et la signature qui clôture un cri. Deleuze classe souvent les philosophes en fonction des cris qu’ils cherchent à pousser.

Cependant, le cri ne deviendra un « cas spécial » pour Deleuze que dans le cadre de ce qu’il nomme la « schrizophrénisation » de la littérature et l’« hystérisation » de la peinture. Dans la formule d’Artaud, « briser la langue pour toucher la vie », Deleuze voit un procédé actif de désorganisation du langage qui transforme la valeur phonétique des lettres-organes par l’action tonique des « cris-souffles ». Les cris d’Artaud sont les crépitements d’un langage affectif dont le ciment est « fluide » et le corps « a-organique ». Lorsque Bacon affirme qu’il cherche à « peindre le cri, plutôt que l’horreur », son vœu comporte pour Deleuze la déformation des figures par l’exploration amiboïde des « contours » : la « bouche qui crie » devient un organe indéterminé par lequel le corps s’échappe vers un « aplat » matériel « vif et dur ». Si le « fait intensif » du Corps sans Organes permet à Deleuze de rapprocher Bacon et Artaud, il nous semble que le geste du cri invite à les séparer : le cri-souffle est une action qui « plonge » les mots dans la « profondeur » du corps tandis que le cri peint est une opération qui « module » les figures dans la « profondeur maigre » d’un système corps-couleur-plan.

En 1969, Deleuze développe dans son “roman logique et psychanalytique” l’idée d’une genèse de la parole qui suppose une série de transformations énergétiques : des pulsations « physiques » qui deviennent des pulsions « libidinales » pour se transformer ensuite dans l’énergie potentielle d’une « surface » désexualisée. Le système sonore du corps, dont le cri-souffle fait partie, retrouve ainsi son plein usage dans une bouche libérée du bruit, possédée par les voix venues d’en haut et remplie de paroles insolites. Plus tard, en 1981, avec le cri-peint, Deleuze explore la vibration, l’accouplement et la dissipation des figures par une “force sans objet” qui conserve cependant le contour d’un inquiétant sourire. Il faudrait alors distinguer le cri-souffle qui menace “du fond” le corps-langage avec une catastrophe, la “faillite” de l’organisation inappréciable du point de vue logique de la « surface », mais aussi le cri-peint dans la « profondeur superficielle » de la viande où les têtes rencontrent le “chaos” en conservant le sourire.

References

Deleuze, Gilles. 1969. Logique du sens. Paris: Editions de Minuit.

———. 1988. Le Pli: Leibniz et le Baroque. Paris: Editions de Minuit.

———. 2002. Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation. Paris: Editions du Seuil.

Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1991. Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? Paris: Editions de Minuit.

 

On the Logics of Force in Deleuze-Leibniz

Claudia Mongini

Departing from the problem of the relation between the one and the many from which Deleuze, in his book on Leibniz, constructs the singular relation between the sensible and the intelligible, I will introduce the concept of force, in terms of a fold of matter. I take into particular account the process of synthetic construction, in its double aspects of genesis and production, which Leibniz developed in a series of geometrical studies.

The first problem to be addressed consists in the delineation of the character of Leibniz’s constructivist logic. This is expressed by the potential of creating real entities—that is, both concrete objects and abstract relations. Thereby, I will carefully analyse the combinatorial facets from the point of view of their “technical criteria”: I will enter into the complex relation subsisting between the concept of invention understood as expression of singularity and the project of construction of a “logical architecture of multiplicities.” Within this frame of reference, the concept of logic comes to constitute the trait d’union between the project of a generative metaphysics (onto-logics) and an epistemological one. I will proceed with the examination of the concept of force, by placing the question of the role of physics within the onto-epistemological dimension delineated before. By taking into consideration Leibniz’s essays written from 1690 (the essays on mechanics and the 1692–98 essays on dynamics), I will focus on two problems: the question of experience and that of genetic construction out of a supra-geometric entity.

Two movements of thought will be articulated: an a posteriori one, which takes into account the effect produced by force, and an a priori one, which considers instead force from its generative conditions—space, time and action. I will then address the concept of derivative force in its relation to contingency—that is, in relation to the specificity of concrete chains of entities. Out of this description I will problematise the concept of force in its intrinsic relational (and thus transversal) conditions. I will articulate this question on the two levels examined before: on the ontogenetic level, by following the question of how the movement of force comes to generate a minimal condition within nature; and on the epistemic level, by outlining the problem of the relation between matter and dynamics before the cuts produced by the disciplinary division of knowledge have taken their effect. This level of problematisation allows the problem to shift from matter-force to force-brain, and thus raises the aesthetic question of an autoplastic reconstruction of the machinic complex of nature. Can this level be considered in terms of a knot where philosophy is intimately tied up with art as process?

 

 

Homeomorphic Sound

Emiddio Vasquez

Taking as a point of departure Deleuze and Guattari’s thoughts in What is Philosophy? on the inseparability of sensation from the material conditions of any art form’s medium, one cannot help but ask, What are we to make of digital art, and in particular digital sound? It is all too simple to dismiss the battered dualism of analogue versus digital reproduction of sound, but the resurgence of analogue synthesis along with the ever-expanding industry of digital sound synthesis invites us to explore further these two domains. From an ontological perspective, these two domains correspond to the two types of multiplicities (discrete and continuous ones) that Deleuze imposes on Bergson’s philosophy by referring to physico-mathematician Bernard Riemann. The latter defines music as being a rare case of a continuous manifold that we can experience in everyday life, which in return necessarily problematises its digital or discrete reproduction.

This problem invites us to rethink the means by which the smooth and striated fuse with one another, as Deleuze and Guattari put it. I would like to elaborate on a possible approach borrowed from topology: homeomorphisms. With this criterion in mind, I would like to discuss some of the techniques that validate this fusion and critically engage with ones that do not. I propose this critical discussion in relation to particular cases concerning the analysis of musical samples as well as problems encountered in my own experience of making music. The idea of synthesis will thus be explored in respect to a multilayered set of levels: on the level of disjunction between analogue and digital and on that of ontology and mathematics, as well as within breaks occurring in practice.

 

 

Dialogue III: On Music or The Combat of Chronos and Aion

Whereas Chronos was inseparable from the bodies which filled it out entirely as causes and matter, Aion is populated by effects which haunt it without ever filling it up. Whereas Chronos was limited and infinite, Aion is unlimited, the way that future and past are unlimited, and finite like the instant.
—Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 165

Already in 1969, thinking about extra temporality of the event, and inspired by the Stoics, Deleuze rehabilitated for contemporary thought the distinction between Chronos and Aion. Introducing an outside of time into the inner fabric of time itself, Deleuze argued for a chronology that is derived from the event—the event being the singularity that originates any given chronology. For a musician, for someone permanently involved in the radical here and now of the performative moment or compositional decision, Deleuze’s argumentation seems completely logical, even if paradoxical. Later, in collaboration with Guattari and particularly in A Thousand Plateaus (1980), Deleuze further developed notions of time that are seminally related to Pierre Boulez’s concepts of the smooth and the striated: (1) the non-pulsed and the pulsed flow of musical time, and (2) the continuum or the discontinuum of musical spaces. Boulezian dualisms, like Deleuzian ones, are meant neither as oppositions nor as dialectical pairs; more creatively, they refer simply to attractors, which might be activated or not, according to different actualisations of forces. The combat of Chronos and Aion is, therefore, not to be seen as a fight between opponents, but rather as lightings, as bidirectional discharges of power between two fields loaded with differential energy.

For this dialogue, the combat of Chronos and Aion is taken both as an initiator to the discussion and as a pars pro toto in terms of possible relations between Deleuze and musical practices: How and to what extent can the work of Gilles Deleuze contribute to or enhance new understandings of music? How can it be used reflexively and productively? Is there a new music after Deleuze, a new musicology after Deleuze, a new performer after Deleuze, a new listener after Deleuze?

This dialogue is born out of a public dissensus: Brian Hulse’s review (2015) of Edward Campbell’s book Music after Deleuze (2013), and Edward Campbell’s response to Hulse’s review (2015), a debate that makes reference to some texts by Martin Scherzinger and a debate that was published at a time when Martin was a visiting research fellow at the Orpheus Institute (February 2015). In a slightly provocative gesture, but in the sense of enabling a richer debate on Deleuze and music we decided to invite all parts and have a productive dialogue on music before, after, with, or without Deleuze.

Paulo de Assis, chair

References

Campbell, Edward. 2013. Music after Deleuze. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Campbell, Edward. 2015. ‘Musicology after Deleuze: Response to Brian Hulse’s Review of Music after Deleuze – All Music is ‘Deleuzian’. Deleuze Studies Journal, 9 (1), 145-52.

Deleuze, Gilles. 1990. The Logic of Sense. Translated by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale. Edited by Constantin V. Boundas. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hulse, Brian. 2015. ‘Review of: Edward Campbell. 2013. Music after Deleuze, London: Bloomsbury’, Deleuze Studies Journal, 9 (1), 137-45.

Dialogue I: On Performance or Untimely Fabulation

The question of the dark precursor should not be mistaken as an instant in a chronological unfolding of events. In determining intensities “in advance but in reverse, as though intagliated” the dark precursor actually lacks a sense of empirical time and it lacks its article. It is not a mere “one” but a singularity—that is, an actual occasion beyond the measure of time while being in time. What if we conceive of the performative dislodged from a simplified sense of present while accounting for its power of instauration—its capacity for making present that which is in time but never of a mere present moment? With the participants of this Dialogue, we will explore different modes of untimely fabulation, a mode of thinking and literally invoking the in-act of performance across forms of creative practice in philosophy and art. Performance becomes the point of entry for negotiating a sensibility for ethico-aesthetic attunements toward emergence, without knowing in advance how a situation, a body, or relations will play out in their actualisation. The in-act of performance designates a thought and practice in the act of its very own fabulation—that is, of the coming Dialogue.

Christoph Brunner, chair